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Abstract 
Despite the traditional focus on metaphysical issues in discussions of natural kinds in biology, 
epistemological considerations are at least as important. By revisiting the debate as to whether taxa are 
kinds or individuals, I argue that both accounts are metaphysically compatible but one or the other 
approach can be pragmatically preferable depending on the epistemic context. Recent objections against 
construing species as homeostatic property cluster kinds are also addressed. The second part of the paper 
broadens the perspective by considering homologues as another example of natural kinds, comparing 
them with analogues as functionally defined kinds. Given that there are various types of natural kinds, I 
discuss the different theoretical purposes served by diverse kind concepts, suggesting that there is no 
clear-cut distinction between natural kinds and other kinds, such as functional kinds. Rather than 
attempting to offer a unique metaphysical account of ‘natural’ kind, a more fruitful approach consists in 
the epistemological study of how different natural kind concepts are employed in scientific reasoning. 
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Although most discussions of natural kinds in evolutionary biology and systematics focus on 
metaphysical issues (e.g., what is a natural kind, or which biological things are kinds), 
epistemological considerations are at least as important (e.g., what epistemic-theoretical aims are 
pursued by using various natural kinds concepts, or how well are they met using a certain way of 
grouping objects into a kind). In the case of biological taxa, most biologists and philosophers 
favor the idea that species are individuals rather than natural kinds. Yet recently some 
philosophers have interpreted species as natural kinds using a revised notion of ‘natural kind’ as 
homeostatic property cluster, which has also gained acceptance among a few biologists (Keller et 
al. 2003; Rieppel 2007). I clarify how the notion of natural kind can be applied in the case of 
species and higher taxa by answering some objections, in particular the idea that natural kinds 
cannot be subject to evolutionary change (Sections 1 and 2). At the same time, I argue that a 
species or a higher taxon can be construed both as an individual and a natural kind, i.e. both 
views are metaphysically compatible. Yet one conceptualization can be pragmatically preferable 
depending on the epistemic considerations that are in play in a certain scientific context. Taxa are 
best construed as natural kinds when they are viewed as taxonomic units, while it is preferable to 
view taxa as individuals when they are conceived of as units of evolutionary change. 
While past discussions have focused on species and other taxa, the aim of this paper is to 
obtain a broader perspective on natural kinds in biology by considering further examples. 
Section 3 discusses homologues. While a higher taxon groups whole organisms, homology 
relates organismal parts by common ancestry. In addition to the analogy to higher taxa, 
homologues are like species units of phenotypic evolution. I argue that homologues as units of 
morphological change can in fact be considered natural kinds, yet this requires a specific way of 
applying the notion of a natural kind. This account will also shed some light on the relation 
between developmental and phylogenetic approaches to homology. Section 4 addresses 
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functional kinds such as analogues. A common philosophical assumption is that functionally 
defined kinds are not natural kinds, as a function can be realized in different ways, so that 
functional kinds are structurally very heterogeneous and lack unity. However, not only clear-cut 
natural kinds (such as homologues) but also functionally defined kinds (such as analogues) can 
figure in important scientific generalizations, which points to an epistemic commonality. 
The concluding section turns explicitly to epistemological issues. Given that the basic 
metaphysical notion of a natural kind is spelled out in different ways for the various kinds 
addressed, the different theoretical-epistemic purposes served by and explanatory advantages 
offered by different kind concepts are emphasized. I argue that there is no clear-cut distinction 
between natural kinds and other kinds (such as functional kinds). Rather than attempting to offer 
a unique metaphysical account of ‘natural’ kind, the more fruitful approach consists in the 
epistemological study of how and for what purposes various natural kind concepts are employed 
in scientific reasoning. 
1. The homeostatic property cluster view of natural kinds 
While species had originally been considered as classes or natural kinds, the view that species 
are individuals (SAI) was proposed in response to the serious problems facing a construal of 
species as kinds (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1978). Most importantly, species are historical entities: a 
species originates, it persists across time at specific spatial locations, it can undergo substantial 
evolutionary change, and it can go extinct. The traditional notion of a natural kind is inadequate 
when applied to species as this notion was tied to kinds as found in physics and chemistry. The 
traditional account (used especially by metaphysicians and philosophers of language) construed a 
natural kind as a special type of class characterized by two features. (1) All members of a natural 
kind have the same characteristic properties, permitting universal generalizations, such as laws of 
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nature (e.g., all oxygen atoms share physical properties and can undergo the same chemical 
reactions). (2) The identity and boundary of a natural kind is metaphysically determined by an 
essence; an object belongs to the kind in virtue of having this essential property. The essence is 
epistemologically fundamental in that it explains the characteristic properties of the kind (e.g., 
the essence of oxygen is its atomic structure, which explains all physical and chemical properties 
of oxygen). The first condition does not apply to species as there is substantial variation across 
the members of a species, and even a feature shared by all conspecifics at a time may be 
modified in evolution. In the case of the second condition, though it has never been part of the 
definition of an essence, an essence has typically been taken to be an intrinsic property of a kind 
member, as in the case of chemical structure. But no intrinsic property (= internal feature) of an 
organism—be it genotypic or phenotypic—can serve as the definition of its species (in contrast 
to merely diagnostic features), as other species members have or may evolve different features. 
Yet the view that species and higher taxa are natural kinds has been revived (Boyd 1999; 
Griffiths 1999; Keller et al. 2003; Rieppel 2005b, 2006, 2007; Wilson 1999, 2005), using the 
view of natural kinds as homeostatic property clusters (HPC) proposed by Boyd (1991). This 
new philosophical notion of a natural kind was developed so as to do justice to natural kinds as 
they are studied in biology and other special sciences. It attempts to reconcile the fact that such 
kinds are typically heterogeneous and cannot be defined by necessary or sufficient conditions, 
with the observation that such categories are not formed in an arbitrary fashion and permit 
scientific generalizations and explanations. 
The HPC view of natural kinds modifies both of the above conditions. (1) For any natural 
kind there is a cluster of properties that are correlated, typically by most of the kind members 
possessing most of these properties. None of the cluster properties has to be possessed by all 
kind members, so that the HPC view permits variation in the distribution of the properties that 
NATURAL KINDS IN EVOLUTION AND SYSTEMATICS 5 
are characteristic of the kind, which is necessary for taxa to count as natural kinds. (2) These 
correlation of properties is brought about and maintained by causal processes (dubbed 
‘homeostatic mechanisms’) in which the kind members figure. It is this set of homeostatic 
mechanisms that determines the identity of an HPC natural kind, i.e. specifies which objects are 
kind members, where vague boundaries are permitted. The kind is a ‘natural’ kind (rather than a 
nominal kind consisting of objects that are grouped together by mere human convention), as our 
grouping of entities into an HPC kind is rooted in objective features of nature. The causally 
grounded property correlation also makes possible the scientific generalizations and explanations 
in which the kind figures. Therefore, the homeostatic mechanisms play the same role as the 
‘essence’ of a traditional kind (metaphysically determining the kind’s identity and 
epistemologically explaining its characteristic properties), yet the HPC view does not require that 
the kind is defined by is a single and unchanging essence rather than a complex property 
including a whole set of dynamic causal processes. To the extent that the kind has vague 
boundaries, among the kind members there may also be some variation in these homeostatic 
features, so that not every kind member need possess all of them to the same extent. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the tacit assumption (fitting chemical kinds) that an essence is an 
intrinsic property, the HPC view explicitly permits extrinsic / relational properties as part of the 
homeostatic mechanisms characterizing a natural kind. (For a more detailed philosophical 
account of the HPC construal of natural kinds see Wilson et al., in press.) 
To illustrate this account briefly with examples, in the case of a higher taxon as a natural 
kind, the property cluster consists in character distributions, usually phenotypic (and genotypic) 
features shared by most species belonging to this taxon, i.e. synapomorphies. The fact that in 
each taxon member these characters tend to occur together and that each character is shared by 
most members is explained by common descent from a founding species, so that common 
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descent is the causal process (‘homeostatic mechanism’) determining the identity and boundary 
of this higher taxon. Common ancestry is an extrinsic (= relational) property: being descended 
from a founding species is a property of a species (belonging to the taxon), but the species has 
this property not solely in virtue of its internal features, but due to its relation to another species. 
In the case of a species as a natural kind, the property cluster consists in shared phenotypic and 
genotypic features or a particular range of variation that several characters exhibit, which make 
the species a genetically and morphologically cohesive entity. The homeostatic mechanisms 
accounting for this are those described by some of the species concepts: gene flow and 
interbreeding, common descent, or ecological selection, all of which are relational properties and 
not just intrinsic to an organism that is a member of the species. For many species taxa several of 
these causal processes are relevant for maintaining the species’s coherence, so that the identity of 
a species as a kind is determined by a whole set of mechanisms that are causally intertwined. As 
a basic metaphysical account of natural kinds, the HPC view is not committed to specific 
homeostatic mechanisms (Wilson et al., in press). It is an empirical question what the relevant 
mechanisms are in the case of species taxa and the answer may vary from taxon to taxon (de 
Queiroz 1999); and there may be more than one answer, making room for pluralism about the 
species category. In sum, by permitting relational features such as common ancestry, the HPC 
view conforms to the fact that history is an important part of the identity conditions of taxa.1 
                                                 
1 Ereshefsky (2007) argues against construing taxa as kinds, claiming that HPC kinds unlike individuals can be 
paraphyletic and even non-historical. However, this conflates the empirical question as to whether all taxa are 
monophyletic with the metaphysical question as to whether such taxa are kinds or individuals. Ereshefsky 
fallaciously concludes from the fact that some “HPC kinds need not be historical entities” that “HPC theory allows 
taxa to be nonhistorical entities” (p. 297; my emphasis). ‘HPC kind’ being a basic metaphysical category, some 
HPC kinds are historical and others are non-historical. In the special case of taxa, for empirical reasons taxa must be 
historical and probably exclusively monophyletic—also when viewed as HPC kinds. Similarly, being monophyletic 
is not part of the metaphysical category of ‘individual’, and some individuals (non-taxa) are not ‘monophyletic’. 
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Note that while the alternative SAI view does not explicitly invoke ‘essences’ (or 
homeostatic mechanisms), it is committed to there being some determining features that settle 
what makes some organisms (but not others) parts of a species and that determine the identity of 
this species-individual across time. These determining features may be unknown, though they are 
at least partially laid out by species definitions (Rieppel 2005b). Still, the position that species 
are individuals has to rely on features determining the identity of a species, viewing these 
features as specifying which organisms are parts of the species-individual, while a natural kind 
approach may view the same features as defining which organisms are members of the species-
kind. In this sense the SAI position is committed to an ‘essence’ (or whatever term is used for the 
feature determining an entity’s identity) to the same extent the HPC view is; and in fact the label 
‘essence’ has nothing to do with taxonomic essentialism.2 
2. Species and higher taxa as individuals and as natural kinds 
A clear advantage of the view that species are individuals stems from the fact that species are 
cohesive units that are able to undergo change. As I do not intend to deny this virtue of the SAI 
position, I focus on laying out why the HPC view can also accommodate this fact about taxa. 
Individuals are the kind of entities that have a spatio-temporal unity, whereas the members of 
traditional kinds (e.g. chemical kinds) are similar, yet spatially and causally unconnected objects. 
                                                 
2 Keller et al. (2003) and Rieppel (2006) argue that SAI is committed to a version of essentialism (features that 
determine a taxon’s identity), which Rieppel calls ‘origin essentialism’ (taxon’s identity is determined by its origin). 
Ereshefsky (2007) objects that these authors conflate origin essentialism and (outdated) qualitative essentialism. 
However, pointing out that origin essentialism is a variety of essentialism does not conflate origin with qualitative 
essentialism. Ereshefsky is obviously inconsistent when both arguing that origin essentialism and qualitative 
essentialism are two distinct types of essentialism and that endorsing origin essentialism (as SAI does) is not 
endorsing essentialism. As proponents of the view that taxa are kinds do not endorse traditional qualitative 
essentialism but permit relational-historical essences, they endorse the same kind of essentialism as the SAI account. 
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This provides a relevant motivation for SAI, but has to be qualified. Barker and Wilson (unpubl.) 
make the useful distinction between integrative and response cohesion. An entity has integrative 
cohesion if its parts are spatially contiguous and there are strong causal connections between the 
parts so as to facilitate integration into a whole. A species taxon has only low integrative 
cohesion: the organisms belonging to a species can occupy remote locations and the causal 
interaction between conspecifics (interaction within the species-individual) is often no higher 
than interaction between such parts of the species-individual and other organisms and inanimate 
objects. In this respect a species taxon is unlike paradigmatic individuals—such as organisms—
that have a high degree of integrative cohesion; and the HPC view can likewise capture this low 
degree of integration as it defines kind membership in terms of relational properties and causal 
connections to other species members (e.g. common ancestry, interbreeding). What species have 
to a high degree is response cohesion, i.e., the feature that the parts of the entity respond together 
(respond in the same way) to external causal influences. Response cohesion does not imply 
integrative cohesion: the parts of the entity can react in the same way even without interaction 
among them because of a common cause or because they face similar causes.3 In the case of 
species, even organisms located at distinct places without any interaction can change in similar 
ways, as they are genetically and phenotypically similar and often encounter similar 
environmental conditions: response cohesion without integrative cohesion. 
The notion of response cohesion is important because it is precisely the sense in which 
species behave as ‘units’ in evolution. The most significant motivation for the idea that species 
                                                 
3 If the different persons living in a neighborhood communicate and interact to exert a social or political 
influence, the neighborhood manifests integrative cohesion. In contrast, in the case of a power outage, different 
persons in this neighborhood could respond in the same way (e.g., lighting candles, calling the electricity company). 
This can have an overall effect (e.g., the restoration of power), in which case the neighborhood displays response 
cohesion without any interaction among the various individuals (Barker and Wilson, unpubl.). 
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are individuals stems from the fact that individuals are the kind of entities that persist across time 
and can undergo change, changing as a cohesive unit. The fact that species evolve has often been 
viewed in conflict with the assumption that taxa are kinds—a legitimate objection given the 
outdated account of natural kinds. Kluge (2003) makes the same objection against the HPC view: 
“whatever is ‘homeostatic’ cannot, by definition, evolve” (p. 234). This is first a misconstrual of 
the HPC view, in that it takes the label ‘homeostatic’ too literally. ‘Homeostatic mechanism’ is a 
technical term that does not imply that the properties of a kind do not change or exhibit variation, 
rather, it refers to those causal processes that determine the boundary and integrity of the kind. 
Kluge’s objection is also not clear about the sense in which species evolve. Species are units 
and evolve as a unit in two related ways: (a) despite intraspecific variation, the different 
members of a species are phenotypically and genetically similar, relative to other species; (b) if 
evolutionary change occurs the species changes as a whole, i.e. the phenotypic and genotypic 
change obtains for most members of the species—response cohesion. At any point in time there 
are similarities across conspecifics (‘homeostasis’), supported by mechanisms such as gene flow 
(one of the several features determining a taxon’s identity on HPC accounts). If significant 
change occurs in some populations, this change is transmitted to other populations via gene flow 
(the homeostatic mechanism), resulting in the species changing as a unit. Thus, some 
homeostatic mechanisms (e.g. gene flow) can both generate unity/similarity at any point and 
account for why change obtains for the entity as a whole (response cohesion). The HPC view 
accounts for the way in which a species is a unit and changes as a unit if it changes. To explain 
why a certain change occurred, other considerations apart from the homeostatic mechanisms 
have to be adduced (mutation, selection)—the HPC view of what a taxon is does not pretend to 
account for why evolutionary change resulted. In general, many species concepts and definitions 
of higher taxa provide an account of the features that determine their boundaries and unity 
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(phylogeny, gene flow, …). Assuming that such accounts are empirically adequate—conforming 
in particular to the fact that taxa evolve—the HPC view can simply take over these features in its 
account of what the ‘homeostatic’ mechanisms are. 
A related objection against the HPC account was brought forward by Ereshefsky and 
Matthen (2005), who claim that as every natural kind account focuses on features shared by the 
members of the kind, it cannot account for variation within taxa, in particular stable 
polymorphisms. But the HPC view recognizes two sets of features: 1) a cluster of properties and 
2) homeostatic mechanisms accounting for the properties’ clustering. The account is committed 
to the features in set 2 being shared by most members of a kind (vague boundaries between 
biological kinds are permitted), because they determine which objects are part of the kind. Other 
features may show substantial variation: a higher taxon is defined by common ancestry from a 
particular species—any species belonging to the taxon must have this (extrinsic) property—yet 
this is consistent with as much character differences within this higher taxon as needed. Even the 
features in set 1 (that are part of cluster diagnostic of the kind) may be subject to variation: as 
such the HPC merely maintains that there is a characteristic distribution and correlation of these 
features. It may be that the distribution is such that a property is shared by all members, or it can 
be such that organisms that have character A1 also tend to have A2, while other organisms have 
B1 (instead of A1), which is correlated with B2. This way the HPC view can cover sexual 
polymorphisms if A1=male and B1=female, and seasonal polymorphisms if A1 refers to a 
particular season or life-history stage (Rieppel 2005b). What is shared are complex and 
conditional properties such as ‘if female than B’ or ‘if larva then C’. Variation and 
polymorphisms may mislead taxonomists for some while, but these complex properties and 
correlations are discovered and clearly taken into account by researchers. 
Ereshefsky and Matthen’s (2005) main complaint about the HPC view is that it does not 
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explain variation within taxa such as stable polymorphisms. I agree that explaining variation is 
important for biology, yet it is not a task for the HPC view or any other account of what 
determines the unity and boundary of a taxon. Take a species exhibiting sexual polymorphism. 
Organisms belong to this species in virtue of certain features H (including common ancestry); 
both males and females share H. The differences between males and females are of course due to 
other features (such as particular genes on sex chromosomes), which are not shared by both 
sexes. The HPC account—specifying that an individual belongs to this species in virtue of 
possessing H—does not and need not explain such differences among species members, but it 
can feed into such an account. The set of homeostatic mechanisms H may include genetic and 
developmental features shared within the species. The male phenotype results from H in 
combination with male sex genes (H+A), the female phenotype results from H together with 
other genes (H+B). Thus, differences among the members of a taxon are explained by a 
combination of causal factors shared by all members (that the HPC view may use to define the 
taxon) and factors specific to a subset of the taxon members. In general, one classification or 
kind concept (e.g. classifying organisms into species or the concept Gallus gallus) cannot be 
expected to capture all generalizations in which organisms figure. Different generalizations may 
require different kind concepts (e.g. ‘male organism’ and ‘female organism’, yielding also the 
subkind ‘male chicken’), and an organism usually belongs to several kinds. 
So far I have focused on species as evolutionary units, acknowledging that construing 
species as individuals fits nicely with species being units of evolutionary change, while arguing 
that species can also be conceived as HPC natural kinds. Now I move to species and higher taxa 
as taxonomic units. Needless to say, taxonomy is in the business of grouping organisms into 
species and organisms/species into higher taxa according to their phylogenetically grounded 
character similarities and differences. A phylogenetic classification yields descriptions that at the 
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same time cover large taxa and assign many correlated features to the organisms of these taxa. 
Apart from providing generalizations of the features of organisms, a phylogenetic classification 
also ties into the evolutionary study of the phylogeny of taxa and their characters. The view that 
taxa are natural kinds (or classes) having organisms as its members fits smoothly with the fact 
that taxa encompass organisms sharing salient biological properties. Still, also the rival view that 
taxa are individuals can accommodate this, once it is pointed out that a taxon as an individual has 
organisms as its parts which can be compared and classified and share many properties. 
Apart from the issue as to which metaphysical category taxa belong to, an important virtue 
of some discussions developing the HPC view has been to address epistemological issues in 
biology. While it is not committed to natural kinds being governed by genuine laws, the HPC 
view stems from the idea that any adequate scientific account of a particular natural kind permits 
important inferences (induction) and explanations (Boyd 1991; Griffiths 1999). Boyd (1999) 
offers a particularly explicit discussion based on the notion of ‘accommodation’. The starting 
point is that biologists have various epistemic aims (inductive and explanatory demands), e.g., 
putting forward generalizations about the phenotypic properties of taxa, or explaining speciation. 
Boyd construes a grouping of objects (a kind) as ‘natural’ in case this group of objects shares 
certain properties that fulfill the inductive and explanatory aims, i.e. accommodate the epistemic 
demands. An account of the natural kind (in particular the specification of the homeostatic 
mechanism determining the kind’s identity) typically answers to fairly demanding theoretical 
issues and for this reason becomes available only based on empirical research, sometimes long 
after the emergence of the idea that there is a natural kind and the introduction of the word 
naming it. Consistent with this, Rieppel (2005b, 2006, 2007) argues that epistemic considerations 
influence the reference of taxonomic terms. 
Several epistemic aims may attach to one and the same natural kind, and a beneficial feature 
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of the HPC view is that it can capture and relate different epistemic endeavors, by showing how 
different scientific approaches capture different aspects of an overall complex phenomenon. A 
natural kind is characterized by a correlation of properties, which permits descriptions and 
inductions. In addition to this, some of the features shared by members of the kind are more 
basic in that they form the causal basis for the correlation of the other features. These features 
making up the homeostatic mechanisms support explanations. For instance, a species shares 
many properties, to which species concepts focusing on diagnostic and operational properties 
may appeal (e.g. the morphological species concept, the phenetic species concept, the 
apomorphy species concept); and a species has a unique evolutionary fate (as pointed out by the 
evolutionary species concept). Other species concepts may focus on explaining some of these 
facts about species, such as explaining shared characters within species and character differences 
across species by phylogenetic branching, gene flow, or ecological selection. In addition to 
phenotypic similarity, the biological species concept and the recognition species concept explain 
why species have a unique evolutionary fate, and they tie into explanations of speciation. 
The HPC approach views these different descriptive and explanatory interests (epistemic 
aims) as compatible. While one scientific account (e.g. one species concept) represents only 
some properties of a kind (because those are sufficient to accommodate the specific epistemic 
interests of a group of biologists), the HPC view highlights how many more properties tied to a 
kind are metaphysically related. By for instance laying out the causal relations among shared 
phenotypic features, cohesion mechanisms, evolutionary unity, the HPC approach also provides 
resources for showing how different scientific representations, concepts, and models are 
epistemically related or can be theoretically integrated. In the case of higher taxa as another 
example, shared features serve as diagnostic characters. The occurrence of such character 
distributions is explained by causal mechanisms such as common ancestry and the operation of 
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developmental constraints. Rieppel and Kearney (2007) argue that a deeper explanatory-
theoretical understanding of the causal basis of character evolution (including accounts of 
developmental constraints, modularity, and ontogenetic repatterning) would improve the 
descriptive practice of taxonomy, by providing insights into which characters are actually 
independent of each other and how informative various characters are for setting up phylogenies. 
My overall conclusion on the individuals vs. natural kinds debate is that both positions are 
metaphysically consistent. I do not see any reason why an object could not be construed as an 
individual and a natural kind at the same time, and take biological taxa—both species and higher 
taxa—to be such objects (as already suggested by Dupré 1993). One metaphysical account can 
be translated into the other and vice versa (see LaPorte 2004 for a detailed discussion): An 
organism is ‘a part of a species-individual’ on SAI, while the HPC view has to conceptualize this 
organism as ‘a member of a species-natural-kind’, and translate any talk about organisms 
accordingly (and vice versa for SAI). An individual changes in the straightforward sense that 
different time slices of this individual have different properties. Yet a species-natural-kind can 
also be conceived of as changing if some of the members of the kind have different properties at 
different times.4 A natural kind has pre-given members that make up the kind in the first place. 
These are individual organisms in the case of taxa—fundamental biological units to which 
descriptions and explanations apply. While an individual does not have pre-given parts, the SAI 
                                                 
4 Stemming from Ghiselin (1974) and Hull (1987), a common objection against viewing taxa as kinds is the idea 
that unlike individuals, kinds are spatiotemporally unrestricted (Ereshefsky 2007). On my account, ‘species-
individual A is spatially unrestricted’ has to be translated by a kind approach as ‘the space occupied by the members 
of species-kind A is unrestricted’. If the putative objection is that the actual space taken up by a species-individual is 
restricted, so is the space taken up by the members of the corresponding species-kind. If instead the objection is 
construed as the idea that it is possible for members of a species-kind to occupy spatial locations far beyond the ones 
they actually occupy, the same applies for the species-individual. E.g., if the boundary of a taxon-individual / taxon-
kind is determined by monophyly, taxon parts/members can possibly occupy any position of the universe insofar as 
it is empirically possible to reach that position without breaking monophyly. 
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approach is not debarred from explaining that any species-individual (and higher-taxon-
individual) has organisms as central parts—parts that share properties so that generalizations 
apply to them. Both the HPC and the SAI view agree in endorsing some sort of realism about 
taxa, at least species taxa. Natural kinds are assemblies of objects that are grouped according to 
properties that actually exist in nature, so that the boundary and unity of a natural kind are not 
conventional. An individual likewise has a non-arbitrary boundary and distinctive unity across 
time. Monophyly is what determines the boundaries of higher taxa, and in the case of species 
there are several properties (common descent, gene flow, ecological selection) that are relevant 
for species cohesion. An HPC approach views these features as the homeostatic mechanisms 
determining membership in a taxon-kind, while SAI construes such features as determining the 
unity of the taxon-individual across space and time. 
Although metaphysically both approaches are fully compatible, there may be pragmatic 
reasons to favor one over the other in a certain epistemic context. In evolutionary contexts where 
species (and sometimes higher taxa) are viewed as evolutionary units that originate, undergo 
change, and go extinct, they are best viewed as individuals. As explained above, natural kinds 
can be conceptualized as changing, yet translating from individual talk to kind talk results in a 
less natural way of speaking in these contexts. In taxonomic contexts, where species and higher 
taxa are viewed as taxonomic units consisting of organisms sharing many biologically important 
characters, it is more natural to speak of taxa as natural kinds (Dupré 1999). This in line with 
Boyd’s (1999) suggestion that “by seeing similarities between the inductive and explanatory 
roles played by reference to natural kinds, on the one hand, and by reference to individuals, on 
the other hand, we can see why the distinction between natural kinds and (natural) individuals is, 
in an important way, merely pragmatic. … A failure to be able to recognize various stages in the 
maturation of an organism as stages of the same organism [individual] would undermine 
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induction and explanation in biology just as much as a failure to deploy accommodated schemes 
of classification for the organisms themselves” (p. 163).5 
3. Homologues as natural kinds 
Discussions about biological kinds have focused on species and other taxa. However, the aim of 
this paper is to arrive at a broader perspective on natural kinds in biology, so that it is vital to 
consider other examples, and to discuss what different types of ‘homeostatic mechanisms’ can 
determine the identity of kinds and what various epistemic aims guide the study of kinds. In this 
section I turn to homologues. Homologues share many features across taxa; and phylogenetically 
based similarities are used to group structures in different organisms/species (token homologues) 
together as homologues or structures of the same type (homologies across species). This 
taxonomic aspect of homology (stressed by taxic approaches to homology) clearly fits the 
conception that homologues are kinds, just like higher taxa are naturally seen as kinds grouping 
species according to their phyletically based similarities. Furthermore, a homologue as a part of 
the body has a morphological and developmental influence (Müller 2003; Love and Raff 2006), 
and these causal properties of homologues provide a further reason to view them as natural 
                                                 
5 While the individualism vs. kinds debate is an issue about species taxa, species pluralism is a question about 
species categories or concepts. I endorse a plurality of species concepts (combined with a generic species concept 
encompassing all particular species concepts similar to de Queiroz 1999), but in addition to metaphysical arguments 
I emphasize that there are also epistemological reasons (Brigandt 2003). The metaphysical basis of pluralism is that 
there are several mechanisms generating species cohesion which sometimes do not align and delineate different 
species taxa, so that different species concepts can focus on one or the other mechanism. But there are also different 
legitimate scientific tasks or epistemic aims pursued (taxonomic, evolutionary, ecological tasks; explanatory, 
operational aims); and a particular species concept may be better suited than others for such an epistemic task. Some 
species concepts (used in some epistemic contexts) focus on species as evolutionary units, while others (used in 
other contexts) focus on species as taxonomic units, which in line with the above means that species are better 
viewed as individuals or kinds depending on the epistemic context and species concept employed. 
NATURAL KINDS IN EVOLUTION AND SYSTEMATICS 17 
kinds—in fact, the question is which possible parts of a body are natural units in that they have a 
distinct developmental role and can function as independent taxonomic characters. Previous 
discussions and explicit defenses of the idea that homologues are natural kinds were given by 
Wagner (1996, 2001) and Rieppel (2005a), appealing to the HPC view. What I want to focus on 
here is homologues as units of evolutionary transformation (as emphasized by transformational 
approaches to homology), laying out how the HPC view and the properties defining a natural 
kind have to be understood in this case to construe homologues as units of change, in analogy to 
regarding evolving species as kinds. 
An important starting point is the distinction between characters and character states. A 
homologue is a character in different species even if it takes on different character states in 
these species. For a homologue to function as a unit of evolutionary transformation, structures in 
different species can be homologous even if these structures are quite dissimilar. If a homologue 
is conceptualized as an individual—which is possible in line with the above account of the 
metaphysical status of taxa—then this homologue-individual has as its mereological parts 
various token homologues (parts of single organisms), which are united as parts of a 
transformation lineage (or actually several lineages leading from an ancestral structure to any of 
its descendant structures). Correspondingly, a homologue construed as a natural kind is a class 
containing various token homologues as its members. Now, previous discussions, in particular 
developmental approaches to homology, have stressed features shared by token homologues. 
However, while token homologues are often similar (of the same state) in closely related species, 
structures in unrelated species can be the same character even if they are in very different 
character states. How to reconcile this with the idea that a natural kind is defined by certain 
features (homeostatic mechanisms) shared by all or at least most kind members? The answer is 
that among the various developmental and morphological properties of a particular structure in 
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an individual, only some determine this structure being homologous to structures in other 
organisms. Certain features of a developmental process may determine the identity of a character 
and occur in every instance of this character in different organisms and species. Yet this 
character takes on different states in different species which is due to other developmental 
features differing between these species. This is in analogy (or homology) to the above point that 
there are certain features that determine the identity of a species or higher taxon (descent from a 
founder group, gene flow) and are possessed by every member of this taxon, while the variation 
within the taxon is due other biological properties that vary among taxon members. 
Which developmental-morphological properties of a structure determine its identity as a 
homologue and which do not (and thus can vary across species) has to be teased apart by detailed 
comparative developmental studies. For instance, Wagner (1989) suggested that homologues are 
characterized by shared developmental constraints. Whatever developmental features are shared 
by structures when they are governed by the same ‘developmental constraints’, Wagner was 
clear about the fact that the sharing of such constraints is consistent with a homologue 
developing differently in different species (Wagner and Misof 1993), so that while some 
developmental features are shared by homologues, others are not. Wagner (2007) recently 
suggested based on concrete cases that there are gene regularity networks which as character 
identity networks (ChINs) are present in any instance of a character across species, whereas 
other genes that are not part of the ChIN vary so as to lead to different character states in 
different species. Thus, the biological properties determining the identity of a homologue as a 
natural kind have a dual role. They are reliably inherited across generations and hard to modify 
(‘constrained’), resulting in the same character being present across individuals and species 
(unless the character merges with others, splits into two, or is simply lost). At the same time, 
these developmental properties determining character identity provide the very basis for this 
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homologue undergoing evolutionary change by permitting other developmental properties to 
change without resulting in the loss of this character. 
Section 1 highlighted the idea that the identity of an HPC natural kind is not necessarily 
constituted by intrinsic properties, i.e., the homeostatic mechanisms specifying what the kind’s 
members are can include extrinsic or relational properties. This is relevant in the present context 
because given that a homologue can take on various character states and thereby vary in its 
internal structure across species, the identity of a homologue may not be determined solely by 
features internal to this structure. My suggestion is that a structure is a homologue as a unit of 
phenotypic evolution to the extent that it is distinct from other such units, i.e., to the extent that 
the structure can undergo phenotypic change largely independently of other homologues 
(Brigandt 2007; see also Wagner 1996; Laubichler 2000). Thus, an important aspect of the 
developmental properties determining the identity of a homologue is the way in which this 
structure is partially developmentally dissociated from other structures so as result in distinct 
(semi-autonomous) units of evolutionary change. The growing literature on modularity (Bolker 
2000; Rieppel 2005a; Schlosser and Wagner 2004; von Dassow and Munro 1999; Winther 2001) 
offers a partial explanation of how structures that are developmentally and functionally related 
can be sufficiently dissociated so as to permit morphological change. Furthermore, homologues 
exist on several levels of organization (homology among genes, developmental processes, adult 
morphological structures, behavioral patterns); and homology on different levels can be 
dissociated, e.g., a homologous structure can develop by different developmental processes and 
by the action of non-homologous genes. As a result, accounting for the identity of a homologue 
involves the question of how this homologue can evolve fairly independently from homologues 
on other levels of organization, despite the close causal relation between entities on different 
levels such as genes, developmental processes, and morphological structures (Brigandt 2006). 
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In sum, different instances of a homologue in different species may share a host of internal 
structural properties, which is important for systematics. Yet despite the focus on shared features 
in many discussions of natural kinds, different instances of a homologue may differ in their 
character states. The ‘homeostatic mechanisms’ determining the identity of a homologue as a 
natural kind are shared by all instances of a homologue, yet these defining developmental 
features are much lower in number than the many similarities of homologous structures in 
closely related species and furthermore may include relational properties. This specifies why the 
structure is a ‘natural’ kind as a natural unit partially dissociated from other parts of the body, so 
that it can function as a unit of phenotypic transformation by changing in its internal structure, 
while its relation to (and dissociation from) other homologues remains largely stable. 
My earlier work attempted to bridge the gap between developmental and phylogenetic 
accounts of homology (Brigandt 2007). Here I merely sketch why I view both approaches as 
compatible and how they are related, adding how the HPC view of natural kinds contributes to 
this. Both approaches simply address different aspects and temporal stages of one complex 
phenomenon. Developmental approaches focus on the developmental-morphological features 
that are the basis of structures being dissociated so that they can evolve as distinct characters. 
This developmentally based potential for evolution manifests itself in certain phylogenetic 
patterns, i.e., distributions of character states. Phylogenetic (taxic) approaches to homology 
simply focus on the phylogenetic manifestation of the potential for evolution in a character-by-
character fashion. The HPC view contributes in clarifying the relation between both accounts as 
follows. A developmental account focuses on the homeostatic mechanisms that form the causal 
basis of homologues as natural kinds. These developmental features (together with other factors 
such as phylogenetic branching and causes of character change such as selection) are the basis of 
the resulting patterns of character state distributions and synapomorphies among extant 
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species—making up the cluster of properties and correlations diagnostic of an HPC natural kind. 
Thus, taxic approaches focus on a homologue as a natural kind in that there is a large cluster of 
shared character states (at least among closely related species); while developmental approaches 
focus on a homologue as a natural kind in that there are features that determine the identity of 
this character as a natural unit of evolutionary change independent of other such units. While 
pursuing quite distinct epistemic tasks (classifying species vs. explaining the developmental basis 
of evolution), both approaches are seen as compatible once it is clarified how they address 
different aspects of one overall process (the phenotypic product of evolution and the 
developmental basis of evolution). 
4. Analogues and other functional kinds 
Apart from kinds defined in terms of structure and/or phylogeny, there are kinds defined in terms 
of function features, so that an account sensitive to the different kinds of biological kinds has to 
consider functionally defined kinds such as analogues and ecological kinds. Some philosophers 
assume that a functional kind is not a natural kind (and instead a set of several natural kinds), on 
the grounds that a function can be realized by different structural means, so that a functional kind 
is structurally heterogeneous, in contrast to the traditional vision that a natural kind is defined by 
a unifying structural feature. However, I argue that a more nuanced picture is needed, as 
functional kinds can figure in important scientific generalizations and explanations, thereby 
possessing an epistemic feature that is also a hallmark of natural kinds. 
Ghiselin (1997, 2002) views analogues as more fundamental than homologues, based on the 
idea that homologues are individuals to which no laws apply, whereas analogues form classes, 
whose members are united by laws of nature. To some extent, Ghiselin has it backwards 
(Griffiths 1994, 1996, 1999). Character individuation by homology is so important for any 
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comparative endeavor in biology precisely because homologues share so many properties, be it 
internal features (morphological, developmental, physiological), be it relational features (relation 
to other structures). The closer related the species compared are, the larger the number of 
properties shared, permitting generalizations across species. These are not laws, but character 
individuation by homology provides the scheme of individuation that permits the generalizations 
with the largest scope and accuracy. Research on model organisms is predicated on the idea that 
findings about a model species permit an inference to the corresponding structures and systems 
in other species—an inductive inference that is fallible, yet reliable. Due to the correlation of 
properties in homologues, knowing that an organism has feature A (say mammary glands) 
warrants the conclusion that it also has feature B (hair). The possibility of these 
generalization/inferences can be explained based on the fact that homologues are individuated in 
terms of common descent and structural features (developmental constraints), so that this ties 
also into explanations in phylogeny, evolution, and development. These facts have been the 
reason for philosophers to view homologues as natural kinds—kinds that share many 
scientifically important properties apart from the properties that were used to pick out the kind. 
Analogues, in contrast, share significantly less properties than homologues because they are 
defined in terms of some function. Functional kinds are what philosophers call multiply 
realizable: there are many different possible physical systems (realizers) that perform the 
function. E.g., money is a functionally defined category from economics; and it can be realized 
by such different physical systems as metal (using gold as a currency), paper (bills), electrical 
states (electronic accounts and transactions)—which have hardly any material properties in 
common apart from the ones any physical entity possesses. In the case of functionally defined 
kinds in biology such as analogues, it is well known that analogues can be structurally extremely 
diverse, as the same adaptive problem can be solved in many different ways (e.g., digestive 
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systems and locomotive systems are very diverse). Being analogues, bird wings and insect wings 
share a fairly low amount of morphological and developmental properties. To be sure, bird wings 
and bat wings share significantly more properties, but this is not because of them being 
analogues (wings as including also insect wings), but because of them being homologues 
(tetrapod forelimbs). The same applies for ecological categories as functional kinds, e.g., fresh-
water predators can achieve their life-style in very different ways. 
Ghiselin (2002), in contrast, maintains that the same laws apply not only to biological 
structures having the same function, but any physical system performing the function, e.g. “the 
wing of a pterosaur, a dragonfly, an airplane, and any other such component” (p. 288). 
Mechanical laws do apply to these structures, yet they also apply to most physical systems. The 
real issue (which Ghiselin misses) is whether there are many principles and properties that apply 
to the instances of a kind but not to other objects. Needless to say, animal wings and aircraft 
wings are totally different in their internal structure, and even different animal taxa differ 
substantially in how they morphologically and physiologically achieve wing movement. Even 
regarding the way in which different wings permit uplift, the similarities are of a modest degree. 
To account for how a particular wing permits flight, the laws of physics have to be applied in a 
concrete model.6 But different models are needed to understand different kinds of wings. For 
instance, modeling insect wing uplift involves non-linear effects resulting from the wing rapidly 
changing its orientation towards the direction of relative air movement, and the fact that insect 
wings are not rigid airfoils but change their three-dimensional shape during flight—both factors 
do not apply for aircraft wings. In sum, while homologues share a host of properties beyond 
those used in the definition (common ancestry), analogues that are multiply realizable like other 
                                                 
6 A law that is applied to one range of systems can be applied to many other kinds of systems. The flipside of the 
universality of laws is that for a particular system, several laws have to be combined in a system-specific manner. 
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functionally defined kinds share significantly less properties—a fact that holds independently of 
whether one views each as a natural kind or an individual, or uses a particular construal of laws. 
Contra Ghiselin, homologues seem to be much more like natural kinds than analogues do.  
However, while the members of a kind defined in terms of phylogeny and/or structure (such 
as homologues) may share more properties than members of a kind defined in terms of function 
(such as analogues), functional kinds are nonetheless scientifically relevant and figure in certain 
generalizations. In line with my above remark, Griffiths (1999) acknowledges that there are 
indefinitely many ways to construct instances of money (so that different instances hardly share 
any internal structure), yet he points out that the concept of money is a central theoretical notion 
of economics and figures in generalizations of this field. E.g., there are principles as to how 
inflation results from an increase in the amount of money being present in an economy; and they 
are general precisely because they apply no matter in which ways money happens to be 
physically realized in a particular economy. What enables these generalizations is that money 
exhibits stable relations with other economic entities, such as exchange of goods and other 
values, the preferences of economic subjects, and economic development. Griffiths conceives of 
money as an HPC kind defined by a relational ‘essence’, and views as one of the virtues of the 
HPC approach that it includes theoretically important kinds of the special sciences as natural 
kinds. In a similar vein, Boyd (1999) construes social kinds as natural kinds to the extent that 
they exhibit stable relations (a social role maintained by social mechanisms) so as to meet some 
of the inductive and explanatory tasks of the social sciences. 
In my view, the same applies to functionally or relationally defined kinds in biology, such as 
some physiological, ecological and behavioral kinds. Different structures that are analogous 
(different members of the kind) may not share many internal properties, but what matters is rather 
the functional relation between a particular analogue and other entities (a kind member and 
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members of other kinds). Likewise in the case of ecological categories: different predators may 
not have much in common and hunt and feed in various ways, yet predators exhibit certain 
relations with their prey species so as to permit ecological generalizations about predator-prey 
interaction. Thus, while the amount of properties shared among members of a functionally 
defined kind may be lower than in the case of more paradigmatic natural kinds in biology 
(homologues, taxa), what is more relevant—than the sheer number of properties—is whether the 
properties shared and the generalizations in which the kind figures are scientifically important 
for the field under consideration. Boyd’s (1999) notion of ‘accommodation’ is yet relevant again: 
Boyd starts out with the inferential and explanatory demands of a scientific field, and given this 
construes a natural kind as a kind that possesses properties that exist in nature and accommodate 
(some of) these epistemic demands, so that an assessment of the significance and ‘naturalness’ of 
a certain kind has to among other things to pay attention to the relevant epistemic demands. 
5. Epistemological issues and the limits of purely metaphysical accounts 
The HPC account maintains that a natural kind is characterized by a cluster of correlated 
properties, and that the metaphysical identity of the kind is determined by a set of homeostatic 
mechanisms, which form the causal basis for the correlation of the former properties. An HPC 
kind is a natural kind differing from an arbitrary grouping of objects by a merely conventional 
definition, as there are many more properties shared by most members of an HPC kind than the 
homeostatic mechanism used to define the kind. The existing correlation of properties can be 
used for the purposes of scientific induction, and the presence of causal features among them 
(e.g. homeostatic mechanisms) forms the basis of explanations. This is a very basic metaphysical 
view of what a natural kind is, and can be applied to different kinds in different ways. 
The above discussion featured several types of natural kinds, and for each such type there 
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are different homeostatic mechanisms specifying the identity of the kind. A higher taxon is 
defined by common ancestry, and possibly also by the operation of developmental constraints 
specific to that taxon, which together with common ancestry account for the character 
similarities among taxon members. A species can be characterized by various cohesion 
mechanisms (accounting for its unity in evolution), including common ancestry, gene flow, 
ecological selection, and developmental mechanisms (accounting for phenotypic unity, life-
histories, or stable polymorphisms). This shows that for many natural kinds in biology, its 
boundary is not defined by a single feature, but by a whole set of causally interdependent 
processes, permitting even variation in the very features determining the kind’s metaphysical 
identity. There are cases where one species taxon as a natural kind may be characterized by a 
homeostatic mechanism (e.g. interbreeding) that does not obtain for another species as a further 
natural kind (e.g. an asexual species). A homologue as a natural kind is constituted by certain 
developmental-morphological features (e.g. developmental constraints), which form the material 
basis for this homologue serving as a unit of phenotypic transformation. While the philosophical 
tradition has often viewed the identity of many objects being determined by intrinsic properties, 
we saw that the above types of natural kinds are defined at least in part by extrinsic and 
relational properties (which the HPC view explicitly permits). I take it that it is quite typical for 
kinds in biology that they are (partially) characterized by extrinsic properties.7 
Thus, the HPC view of natural kinds is quite flexible and can be applied to many different 
types of natural kinds. The flipside of this is that the very claim that a collection of objects forms 
an HPC natural kind is relatively weak and as such not informative. The real question is how and 
                                                 
7 E.g., a gene is a particular stretch of DNA, yet what makes this DNA segment a gene is its causal ability to 
code for a functional product, which also depends on DNA elements external to this gene and on non-genetic factors 
(a gene can turn into a pseudogene because of changes external to it). Being a gene is a property of a DNA segment, 
but an extrinsic one (holding in part due to features external to the bearer of the property). 
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for what reason these objects form an HPC kind; in particular, what the particular properties that 
are fairly reliably correlated are, and what the specific homeostatic mechanisms forming the 
causal basis for this correlation and the unity of the kind are. Knowing about these concrete 
features characterizing a particular natural kind permits scientific inferences and explanations—
what Boyd (1999) calls ‘accommodation’ of scientific demands. The very metaphysical fact that 
something is a natural kind implies that there are properties that (if known) can be used for the 
purposes of scientific induction and explanation, yet such epistemic aims are actually met only to 
the extent to which there is a natural kind concept that embodies knowledge about the 
scientifically relevant features of the kind.8 
This shows both that the metaphysical distinction between natural kinds and other kinds is 
vague and that epistemological considerations are vital when discussing various kinds. The 
traditional idea is that natural kinds are scientifically important because they exhibit fundamental 
properties supporting explanations. The HPC view does not assume that natural kinds can be 
theoretically important only if they figure in universal laws, so as to capture how kinds figure in 
theorizing in biology and other special sciences. As a result, there is no clear-cut criterion as to 
how many properties have to be correlated to which extent (and which causal features a 
homeostatic mechanism must have) that would determine whether a kind is an HPC natural kind 
or a non-natural kind. Apart from making the boundary between natural and other kinds a matter 
of degree, the real issue is the extent to which the inferences and explanations supported by the 
known properties of the kind are scientifically important. This involves the epistemological study 
of what the various inferential and explanatory aims of different scientific subdisciplines are, 
                                                 
8 The HPC view acknowledges that such an account/concept of the natural kind, in particular its homeostatic 
mechanisms basis, may become available not until substantial empirical discoveries are made, long after the 
introduction of the term denoting the putative natural kind. 
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how they relate to each other, and how they are or can be met by scientific representations and 
kind concepts. 
For instance, Boyd (1999) and Griffiths (1999) argue that social kinds and other kinds used 
in the special sciences can be natural kinds, and their examples make this point not by counting 
how many properties are correlated in such a kind or by assessing to which extent the 
generalizations they figure in count as laws, but by pointing out that the kinds support 
explanations that happen to be theoretically important given the scientific aims of the particular 
fields. Similarly, I acknowledged in the previous section that the individuation of structures in 
terms of analogy or function is legitimate as it meets some theoretical demands in biology, so 
that functional kinds can qualify as natural kinds. (This holds even if character individuation in 
terms of homology may in some contexts be more important than in terms of analogy given that 
homology provides one fundamental individuation scheme that contributes to meeting many 
other theoretical aims, and is used even in contexts where also functionally defined kinds are 
important).9 As a negative example, take Machery’s (2005) discussion of concepts in 
psychology. His legitimate point is that what psychologists call concepts consists actually of 
several different kinds of cognitive structures (prototypes, exemplars, …), all of which underlie 
some conceptual performances, so that debates among psychologists on ‘concepts are 
prototypes’ vs. ‘concepts are exemplars’ are misguided. Machery’s conclusion is that the notion 
                                                 
9 Okasha (2002) recognizes that on the traditional picture, a natural kind’s essence has two roles: (1) determining 
the kind’s identity, (2) causally explaining the kind’s characteristic properties. While essences have often been 
construed as intrinsic properties, Okasha argues (in line with my account) that the traditional account can be revised 
by permitting relational essences. However, he maintains that in this case essences cannot play the putative second 
role, based on the assumption that only intrinsic properties can underwrite generalizations and explanations. My 
discussion shows that he is wrong on that count. The causal effect of many biological kinds (e.g. genes producing 
RNAs and polypeptides) depends on their context and relations to other entities. Successful explanations in ecology, 
physiology, economics and other disciplines routinely invoke extrinsic factors and stable relations among entities. 
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of ‘concept’ is not as important for psychology, and should be replaced in favor of more 
discriminating notions (such as ‘prototype’, ‘exemplar’). This is an interesting epistemological 
tenet about the scientific relevance of the psychological notion of a ‘concept’, to be debated in 
these terms; yet Machery attempts to establish this epistemological conclusion via a 
metaphysical detour, by trying to lay out a metaphysical definition of what a natural kind is and 
to show that concepts are not a natural kind (as consisting of distinct subkinds). 
In my view, the question as to whether or not a scientific kind is theoretically important 
cannot be conducted in terms of whether it is a natural kind or another kind. Rather than 
attempting to offer a unique metaphysical account of ‘natural’ kind, the more fruitful approach 
consists in the epistemological study of how and with which success different natural kind 
concepts (and other concepts) are employed in scientific reasoning. Rieppel (2005b, 2006, 2007) 
discusses how theoretical considerations are relevant for how taxonomic terms (conceived as 
natural kind terms) are used, and how epistemic issues influence the reference and semantics of 
such terms. The above discussion of various biological kinds pointed to different epistemic aims. 
Some kind concepts support mere descriptions (induction, inference, generalization), other 
concepts support causal-mechanistic explanations. Some species concepts serve only taxonomic 
descriptions and classifications, other species concepts support evolutionary explanations. Some 
meet several such biological demands once combined with other concepts or items of 
knowledge. To cite just one among several examples, the biological species concept accounts for 
phenotypic unity within a species (given that the phenotypic expression of genes shared due to 
gene flow is taken into account), it accounts for some cases of speciation (once biogeographical 
considerations are added), and it explains how a species can undergo evolutionary change. A 
developmental homology concept accounts for the behavior of homologues in development, but 
also for their evolutionary role (by specifying how modularity and developmental dissociation 
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permit different homologues to change in evolution as independent units, once other causal 
mechanisms such as natural selection effect change), which ties into phylogenetic character 
distributions relevant for systematics (Rieppel and Kearney 2007). 
While a kind concept abstracts away from many features of reality and is not able to serve 
all scientific purposes, the concept may very well succeed in meeting some epistemic aims, so 
that it is important to get clear about which theoretical-epistemic purposes a natural kind concept 
is meant to serve (Love, this issue). In some cases, different such epistemic aims are compatible 
and can be jointly met by an integrated model or account of the kind, and the HPC view of kinds 
contributes to this by pointing out that many properties can be tied to a single biological kind and 
exhibit complex relations. Even if the features used to define an HPC kind result in this kind 
having a vague boundary, this is legitimate as long as the features support important scientific 
generalizations and explanations. The upshot of my discussion for the individualism vs. kinds 
debate is that the relevant question is not so much into which metaphysical category species and 
higher taxa fall, but how biological accounts of taxa (such as species concepts) underwrite 
classifications and generalizations, shed light on the unity of taxa across time, and permit 
explaining their ability to undergo change as a unit—all of which are epistemic issues. 
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